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People use information actively maintained in spatial working 
memory (SWM) in a seemingly effortless and fl exible way. In par-
ticular, people can generate a variety of different responses based 
on location-related information held in working memory, includ-
ing action responses (e.g., a reach toward the drawer to retrieve the 
keys) and verbal responses (e.g., “the keys are in the desk draw-
er”). Moreover, people can generate these different types of re-
sponses in the face of different task demands. For instance, adults 
can recall the locations of important objects in the absence of im-
mediate perceptual cues (e.g., reaching for a coffee cup occluded 
by a stack of papers). They can also recognize or select a target lo-
cation from an array of visible options (e.g., selecting the correct 
Styrofoam coffee cup on a table with several identical half-empty 
cups).
These examples raise several fundamental questions: What is 
the nature of the memory system (or systems) that underlies per-
formance in these different situations, and what processes do peo-
ple use to access SWM in the context of different response types 
and different response cues? Three literatures have produced ini-
tial answers to these questions; however, the answers differ in type 
(formal theories vs. verbal theories), content (one spatial memory 
system vs. two), and extent (whether they address devel opmental 
changes in spatial memory).
Spatial Recall and Formal Theories of Spatial Memory
One literature has focused on these questions by looking at the 
characteristics of spatial memory in recall tasks. In these tasks, 
participants are shown a single target location either in “empty” 
space (e.g., Mclntyre, Stratta, & Lacquaniti, 1998; Soechting & 
Flanders, 1989) or inside a geometrical fi gure (e.g., Huttenlocher, 
Hedges, & Duncan, 1991; Huttenlocher, Newcombe, & Sandberg, 
1994; Laeng, Peters, & McCabe, 1998; Werner & Diedrichsen, 
2002). The target is then removed, there is a short delay, and par-
ticipants are asked to reproduce the target location, typically by 
pointing or placing an × at the remembered location.
One pervasive result across a number of studies of short-term 
recall is that people use visible reference axes—lines, edges, and 
symmetry axes—to help maintain location information in memo-
ry. Use of such axes provides a stable way to group or categorize 
objects. Nevertheless, there is a cost: When people are asked to re-
produce the location of a target near a reference axis after a delay, 
they show geometric biases’, that is, responses become systemati-
cally distorted away from the reference axis. For in stance, Hutten-
locher et al. (1994) asked 10- 11-year-old children and adults to re-
produce the locations of dots within a rectangular frame. Respons-
es were biased away from the left and right edges of the frame 
and away from the midline symmetry axis (for related errors, see 
Engebretson & Huttenlocher, 1996; Huttenlocher et al., 1991; 
Laeng et al., 1998; Nelson & Chaiklin, 1980; Sandberg, Hutten-
locher, & Newcombe, 1996; Schiano & Tversky, 1992; Tversky 
& Schiano, 1989). It is important that recent data have shown that 
geometric biases emerge continuously during short-term delays. 
Spencer and Hund (2002, 2003) reported that geo metric biases in-
creased systematically across delays of 0–20 s, and Diedrichsen 
and colleagues (e.g., Werner & Diedrichsen, 2002) found geomet-
ric biases at delays as short as 50 ms.
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In addition to these empirical fi ndings, the spatial recall litera-
ture has contributed two formal models of spatial memory—the 
category adjustment (CA) model (Huttenlocher et al., 1991) and 
the dynamic fi eld theory (DFT; Schutte, Spencer, & Schöner, 
2003; Spencer & Schöner, 2003). According to the CA model, 
people represent the fi ne-grained location of a target—that is, the 
direction and distance of the target from a reference location—
and the category in which the target is located (Huttenlocher et al., 
1991). Categories are formed by dividing space through the use 
of visible and mentally imposed axes. These category boundaries, 
along with the central, or prototypical, member of each category, 
are stored in memory. When asked to reproduce a target location, 
people combine their fi ne-grained and categorical representations 
on the basis of the certainty of the fi ne-grained information. Con-
sequently, they produce errors away from reference axes and to-
ward spatial prototypes because all locations within a region are 
weighted with the same prototype. For example, in the rectangle-
dot task, participants divide the rectangle into two spatial catego-
ries with prototypes at the centers of the left and right halves. Af-
ter a short delay, memory for an item in, for instance, the left cat-
egory is weighted with the left prototype producing an error in this 
direction..
Although the CA model effectively captures the pattern of bias 
seen in spatial recall tasks, it does not specify the time-dependent 
processes that underlie the increase in geometric bias over delays 
(see Schutte & Spencer, 2002; Spencer & Hund, 2003; Werner & 
Diedrichsen, 2002). The DFT captures these processes by using a 
neurally plausible network model that specifi es how location-re-
lated activation is maintained in SWM during short-term delays 
(Spencer, Lipinski, & Samuelson, in press; Spencer & Schöner, 
2003, 2006). Neurons in the DFT are spatially tuned such that neu-
rons with similar “preferred” locations excite one another, whereas 
neurons tuned to very different preferred locations inhibit one an-
other (for neurophysiological evidence of this type of inter action, 
see, e.g., Georgopoulos, Taira, & Lukashin, 1993; Goldman-Ra-
kic, 1995). As a result of this locally excitatory/ laterally inhibi-
tory form of neural interaction, the model can sus tain a localized 
“peak” of activation even in the absence of target-related input. 
This gives the DFT a robust form of working memory (see also 
Compte, Brunei, Goldman-Rakic, & Wang, 2000; Renart, Song, & 
Wang, 2003). It is important to note, however, that the DFT also 
captures how people use perceived frames of reference such as a 
midline symmetry axis (Spencer et al., in press). At the start of 
each trial, the model establishes “reference” peaks that are cali-
brated with perceived frames of reference in the task space. These 
reference peaks leave traces of activation in long-term memory. 
This allows the model to remem ber target-related information in a 
calibrated reference frame and to recall previous reference frames 
at a later time. The cost of this mechanism, however, is that refer-
ence-related information can bias information in working memo-
ry. In particular, self-sustaining peaks near a reference frame are 
stabilized by information in long-term memory, whereas peaks to 
the left or right of a reference frame are repelled from the frame 
because of strong laterally inhibitory interactions.
As this survey of the CA and DFT models demonstrates, both 
models effectively capture participants’ geometric biases in spatial 
recall tasks. But how general are these models? Can they account 
for behavior in different tasks, tasks that probe memory in differ-
ent ways or require a different response type? And how pervasive 
are geometric biases? Do they emerge only in artifi cial recall tasks 
when people must point to a location in empty space? These ques-
tions remain unanswered. As such, it is not clear whether these 
models provide a robust framework for examining the fl ex ibility 
of spatial cognition.
Sensorimotor and Verbal Response Types: 
Two Spatial Memory Systems?
A second literature has examined the nature of the spatial mem-
ory system underlying fl exible performance across contexts by 
comparing response errors when participants generate different 
response types, most notably, pointing versus verbal responses 
(e.g., Bridgeman, Gemmer, Forsman, & Huemer, 2000; Brungart, 
Rabinowitz, & Durlach, 2000). Here, there is some consensus that 
different response types tap different spatial memory systems: a 
“sensorimotor” system that encodes locations in the service of mo-
tor actions and a “cognitive” system that encodes locations in the 
service of verbal responses (Bridgeman, 1999; Bridgeman et al., 
2000; Brungart et al., 2000). For instance, Brungart et al. (2000) 
asked adults to reconstruct a remembered location imme diately af-
ter target presentation by using one of four response types—di-
rect pointing or three types of verbal response. Pointing respons-
es were the most accurate, yet unlike the verbal response types, 
such responses were sensitive to response delays (see also Spen-
cer & Hund, 2002; Werner & Diedrichsen, 2002). Brungart et al. 
concluded that the motor system relies on a location memory that 
degrades whereas the cognitive system relies on a stable verbal 
report formed at target presentation (see Bridgeman et al., 2000; 
Bridgeman, Kirch, & Sperling, 1981; Bridgeman, Peery, & Anand, 
1997; Proffi tt, Bhalla, Gossweiler, & Midgett, 1995).
Results from Crawford, Regier, and Huttenlocher (2000) also 
suggest that different representational systems underlie sensorimo-
tor and verbal response types. When adults were asked to apply a 
spatial preposition (e.g., above) to a display depicting a target and 
a referent object, their judgments were most accurate along the 
cardinal axes of the display (vertical and horizontal). By contrast, 
pointing responses after a delay showed geometric biases away 
from the cardinal axes and toward diagonal axes. These research-
ers concluded that the representational systems that underlie ver-
bal and pointing responses rely on different “prototypical” axes in 
the task space (for an alternative interpretation of these results, see 
Spencer et al., in press).
The proposal that different memory systems underlie sensori-
motor and verbal response types makes sense given the demands 
placed on memory by these two response types. Pointing responses 
must be guided by continuous, metric spatial information, where-
as verbal responses are categorical, coarse, and symbolic in nature 
(Huttenlocher et al., 1991; Jackendoff, 1996; Talmy, 1983). Nev-
ertheless, this view of two representational formats raises a fun-
damental challenge: How do people effortlessly and fl exibly gen-
erate different response types—in some cases, combining elements 
of both systems at very short response times (see Bridgeman et al., 
2000)—given the apparently incompatible nature of these spatial 
codes? Answers to this question require formal models that speci-
fy the interface or transduction process that integrates these codes; 
however, there are currently no models that specify such details 
(although see Jackendoff, 1996, for ideas in this direction), and
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neither the CA model nor the DFT has been extended to address 
performance in verbal tasks.
Developmental Changes in Spatial Memory
The two literatures discussed above yield unique insights into 
the fl exible spatial performance of adults, insights that pose tough 
challenges for theories of spatial memory. A third literature pre-
sents yet another challenge: Spatial memory theories must explain 
how effortless, fl exible spatial performance develops over time. 
At face value, the development of sensorimotor and verbal spa-
tial abilities seems to be a case of discontinuous development—
sen sorimotor spatial abilities emerge in infancy and show rapid 
change thereafter (e.g., Acredolo, 1985; Newcombe, Huttenlocher, 
& Learmonth, 1999; Piaget, 1954), whereas verbal spatial abili-
ties emerge much later, reaching profi ciency by 5 to 7 years of age 
(e.g., Craton, Elicker, Plumert, & Pick, 1990; Hermer-Vazquez, 
Spelke, & Katsnelson, 1999; Plumert, Ewert, & Spear, 1995; 
Plumert & Nichols-Whitehead, 1996). Consistent with this discon-
tinuous view, Hermer-Vazquez, Moffet, and Munkholm (2001) 
showed that 5- to 7-year-old children encode spatial relations in 
new ways once they become profi cient at using spatial language. 
In particular, spatial language helps children combine geomet-
ric and nongeometric, featural information following a disorien-
tation procedure that disrupts children’s ability to use dead-reck-
oning to fi nd a hidden object. Without spatial language profi cien-
cy, chil dren rely solely on geometric cues in this task. Additional 
evidence from Hermer-Vazquez et al. (1999) has shown that spa-
tial lan guage plays an important role in adults’ fl exible integration 
of geometric and nongeometric information as well. When adults 
were required to engage in a verbal shadowing task that blocked 
their use of spatial language, they relied solely on geometric in-
formation to fi nd a hidden object after being disoriented. This was 
not the case, however, when adults engaged in nonverbal shadow-
ing of a continuous rhythm. In this case, adults combined geomet-
ric and nongeometric cues.
Although data from Hermer-Vazquez et al. (1999, 2001) are con-
sistent with the discontinuous view, other data suggest that sen-
sorimotor and linguistic abilities coevolve in early develop ment. 
Learmonth, Newcombe, and Huttenlocher (2001) showed that 17- 
to 24-month-olds can use nongeometric information to disambigu-
ate a hiding location in the disorientation task developed by Herm-
er and Spelke (1994, 1996), provided that the task space is large 
enough and the nongeometric cues (i.e., landmarks) are salient and 
spatially stable. Additionally, cross-linguistic evidence has shown 
that infants learn to selectively attend to spatial distinc tions made 
in their native language as they learn language. Hespos and Spel-
ke (2004) showed that, at 5 months, infants from English-speaking 
households were sensitive to the tight- versus loose-fi tting contain-
ment relations distinguished in Korean. By 18 to 24 months, how-
ever, children’s attention to spatial relations begins to correspond 
to distinctions made in their native language (Choi, McDonough, 
Bowerman, & Mandler, 1999). Considered together, results from 
these studies suggest a more continuous, coevolving view of the 
development of sensorimotor and verbal spatial abilities.
This continuity theme has also been echoed in the spatial recall 
literature. Recent evidence has suggested that two types of spa-
tial recall biases—A-not-B-type biases and geometric biases—
de velop via continuous changes in process over development 
(Schutte, 2004; Schutte et al., 2003; Spencer & Hund, 2003). For 
instance. Spencer and colleagues (Schutte et al., 2003; Spencer 
& Schutte, 2004; Spencer, Smith, & Thelen, 2001) have shown 
that, following repeated hiding and fi nding events at an “A” lo-
cation, 2-to 6-year-old children show biases toward A when 
searching for a hidden object at a nearby “B” location. This bias 
is similar to the Piagetian A-not-B error made by 8- to 10-month-
old infants (Pi aget, 1954; Smith, Thelen, Titzer, & McLin, 1999; 
Thelen, Schöner, Scheier, & Smith, 2001). It is important to note 
that Schutte et al. (2003) quantitatively fi t changes in such bias-
es by systematically narrowing and strengthening the local exci-
tation/ lateral inhibition function that governs neural interaction 
in the DFT. This was accomplished via continuous change in a 
single model parameter over development (for related efforts to 
capture developmental changes in geometric biases with contin-
uous changes in parameters of the DFT, see Schutte, 2004; Spen-
cer & Hund, 2003).
Overview of the Present Study
Considered together, the three literatures discussed above raise 
fundamental questions about the nature and development of the 
spatial system (or systems) that underlies the generation of senso-
rimotor and verbal responses in different spatial tasks. The spatial 
recall literature offers two formal theories of spatial memory and 
key insights about continuous changes in memory processes over 
development; however, it is unclear whether these models gener-
alize beyond sensorimotor responses in recall tasks. The two-sys-
tems literature offers a broader view of spatial performance but no 
formal theories to explain how a two-systems view can produce 
the unique characteristics of pointing and verbal response types 
in some tasks yet fast, effi cient integration in others. The develop-
mental literature echoes these themes. There is evidence of inte-
gration: Sensorimotor and linguistic spatial abilities appear to co-
evolve in early development. Yet there is also evidence that verbal 
abilities make a unique contribution to children’s spatial abilities.
Thus, a central challenge is to understand how the balance be-
tween integration and uniqueness is achieved, that is, how a spa-
tial memory system can fl exibly integrate sensorimotor and verbal 
response types yet still produce behavioral signatures unique to 
each type. We contend that formal models can play an important 
role in addressing this challenge by highlighting the limitations of 
current views. For instance, formal models of a two-systems view 
must deal head-on with the problem of incom patible spatial codes 
if they are to engage in realistic, real-time— behavior. By contrast, 
formal models that pose an integrated-systems view must explain 
how behavior in the same task can differ when a sensorimotor ver-
sus a verbal response is required.
In this study, we took a fi rst step toward expanding the role of 
formal theory in the spatial memory literature by asking wheth-
er the processes at work in the CA and DFT models generalize 
to tasks in which participants must make a verbal, recognition-
based response. In particular, we asked whether one type of bias— 
geometric bias—observed in spatial recall tasks with pointing re-
sponses generalizes to a recognition task with a verbal response. 
In addition, we asked whether such generalization depends on 
linguistic expertise by examining the performance of adults and
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7-year-old children. We selected 7-year-olds because previous re-
search has shown that 7 years is the youngest age at which chil-
dren begin to subdivide geometric fi gures along single spatial di-
mensions (Sandberg et al., 1996). It is important to note that this 
age is also within the range examined by Hermer-Vazquez et al. 
(2001). If geometric biases generalize to verbal recognition tasks, 
it suggests that the processes that produce the bias—processes for-
malized in spatial recall models—might be general as well. Re-
sults from three experiments suggest that this is the case but in a 
nontrivial sense: Geometric biases occur in both types of tasks but 
only in particular situations for each age group. Thus, in the Gen-
eral Discussion section, we consider whether these models can 
capture both the integration and the uniqueness of these response 
and task types. This sets the stage for a more general, process-
based account of SWM.
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, we used a modifi ed version of the rectangle-
dot task described previously. On each trial, 7-year-old and adult 
participants were shown a target dot within a rectangle followed 
by a short memory delay. After the delay, participants were cued 
to make either a sensorimotor response—to draw an × at the 
remem bered location—or a verbal “choice” response. On these 
choice trials, participants were shown a set of colored dots, one 
of which was in the original target location. They were instructed 
to say the color of the dot that matched the target. Thus, some tri-
als required participants to recall the target location and generate a 
motor response; other trials probed memory with a recognition or 
choice set (colored dots) and required a verbal response. It is im-
portant to note that participants did not know which response and 
task type would be cued at the end of each trial. Consequently, the 
task space, remembered locations, and memory delays were iden-
tical across tasks.
If geometric biases are unique to sensorimotor responses in spa-
tial recall tasks, participants’ responses on the draw trials should 
replicate the pattern of error reported by Huttenlocher et al. (1994); 
however, this pattern of error should not be observed on choice tri-
als. Indeed, on the basis of previous studies showing that verbal 
responses remain stable during short-term delays (e.g., Bridgeman 
et al., 1997; Brungart et al., 2000) and that 7-year-olds are profi -
cient at spatial language (Hermer-Vazquez et al., 2001), we ex-
pected participants to be relatively accurate in this task. It is also 
possible, however, that participants will show geometric bi ases on 
the choice task. This would demonstrate that this class of bias is 
not unique to a sensorimotor spatial system, suggesting that the 
processes formalized in the CA and DFT models extend to verbal 
responses in recognition tasks as well.
Method
Participants. Participants were 30 seven-year-olds (M age = 7.52 
years, SD = 0.73 months) and 30 adults (M age = 19.27 years, SD = 9.52 
months). Two additional children and 1 additional adult participated, but 
data from these participants were not included in the fi nal analyses be-
cause of experimenter error. Potential child participants were drawn from 
a database at a large midwestern university; their names were original-
ly obtained from birth records in the area. Parents of these children were 
contacted by letter and then by a follow-up phone call. Children received 
gifts worth approximately $3-$4 for participating. Adults were recruited 
through an introductory psychology course and received research partici-
pation credit. Each group consisted of roughly half male and half female 
participants.
Apparatus. Participants sat across from the experimenter at a long rect-
angular table (approximately 55 cm tall, measuring 165 cm × 53 cm on 
top; see Figure 1). For most of the sessions with children, a parent chose 
to accompany the child for the session; in these cases, the parent sat in a 
chair to the left and behind the child, out of the child’s fi eld of vision. In 
front of the participant, 9.5 cm from the edge of the table, was a small 
frame (21.6 cm × 5.6 cm along the outside edges) in which stimulus cards 
were presented. To the experimenter’s left were an opaque stimulus card 
box and a button. When pushed, the button helped raise the stimulus cards 
out of the frame. To eliminate the possibility that other features of the 
room might be used as landmarks, a white canvas curtain surrounded the 
exper imental area from fl oor to ceiling. The dimensions of the space with-
in the curtain were roughly 2.4 m × 2.1 m.
Five types of stimulus cards were used: target cards, delay cards, draw 
response cards, choice response cards, and feedback cards. All cards mea-
sured 20 cm × 4 cm, were free of extraneous marks, and were white card-
stock, with the exception of feedback cards, which were transparent plas-
tic. Target cards displayed a gray dot, 1 mm in diameter, at a target loca-
tion. Both delay and draw response cards were blank, though delay cards 
were made of heavier cardstock to ensure that targets could not be seen 
through them. Choice response cards showed fi ve differently colored dots, 
all 1 mm in diameter, spaced 5 mm from each other. From left to right, the 
dots were colored black, green, orange, blue, and red. The location of the 
fi ve dots varied from trial to trial such that one dot was in the target loca-
tion on each trial. Feedback cards contained a circle, 3 mm in diameter, 
centered at the target location. When laid over a response card, the circle 
indicated the target location for a given trial.
Procedure. Each session began with a demonstration to ensure that the 
participant understood the task. Figure 2 shows the sequence of card pre-
sentations during this trial. The experimenter presented the target card in 
the frame and asked the participant to remember the location. Then the ex-
perimenter covered the target card with the delay card and instructed the 
participant to look up from the frame while counting aloud to 5 (for chil-
dren) or 10 (for adults). After the delay, the experimenter sequentially pre-
sented both a choice response card and a draw response card; the order 
of the two response types was randomized across participants. When the
Figure 1. Setup of the experimental room. The experimenter present-
ed stimulus cards (stored in the container at B) in the frame in front of 
the participant (see A). The curtain around the room eliminated poten-
tial landmarks. When present for children’s sessions, parents sat in the 
comer of the room, out of the view of the children.
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1. Target Presentation
2. Delay (5 s for children, 
10 s for adults)
3. Choice Response Card 
    OR 
    Draw Response Card
4. Feedback
Figure 2. Event sequence for each trial. Participants were shown only one 
type of response card (i.e., choice or draw) on nondemonstration trials.
choice response card was presented, participants were asked to say the 
color of the dot that was in the same location as the target dot. The experi-
menter then repeated aloud and recorded the color the participant named. 
Next, participants were asked to name all of the colors from left to right, 
to ensure that they were discernible (and that the participants were not col-
or-blind). When the draw response card was presented, participants were 
asked to draw an × where they remembered the target dot being. In the fi -
nal step of the card sequence, the experimenter placed the feedback card 
over the response card and praised the participant’s performance. Before 
proceeding, the experimenter asked whether the participant under stood 
the task. If the participant did not understand the trial, the demon stration 
was repeated. Once the participant understood the task, the exper imenter 
began the practice trials.
Each participant completed 4 practice trials, presented in random order. 
The sequence of events on these trials was similar to that of the demon-
stration, but only one type of response card was presented on each trial 
(note that feedback was given on every trial). Two of the practice trials 
were choice trials, and 2 were draw trials. After the 4 practice trials, the 
participant completed 26 test trials and 4 control trials (see the Experimen-
tal design section), presented in random order. The sequence of events in 
these trials was the same as for the practice trials. If a child participant 
appeared to be distracted during the session, a break was offered, though 
most children did not need breaks. Adult participants and parents were de-
briefed at the end of the session.
Experimental design. Thirteen locations were used as targets for the test 
trials. From the left edge of the card, the targets were at 12.5-mm intervals 
beginning at 25 mm (ending at 175 mm) and centered vertically on the 
card (see Figure 2). These locations were a subset of those used by Hut-
tenlocher et al. (1994).1 Each target location was used once for a choice 
trial and once for a draw trial. Different locations were used for demon-
stration, practice, and control trials. For these trials, target locations were 
randomly selected from the 11 locations in between (6.25 mm) the target 
locations; these locations were not repeated.
For choice response cards, we randomly selected which colored dot 
would match the target for that trial. To allow participants to err in either 
direction on choice test trials, the dot that matched the target was selected 
from the three central dots rather than from either of the end dots. Given 
that this might cause participants to adopt a strategy in which they avoided 
the two end choices (because these choices were never correct on the test 
trials), we included control trials in which the end dots always matched the 
target. The end choices were also randomly selected as correct responses 
for some of the practice trials. Overall, the end choices were correct on ap-
proximately 25% of the choice trials.
Method of analysis. To compare performance across locations and re-
sponse types, responses were coded as errors from the target. Draw re-
sponses were measured from the target location to the center of the × 
drawn by the participant. Leftward errors were assigned negative values, 
and rightward errors were assigned positive values. Choice responses were 
calculated by measuring the distance between the dot that matched the tar-
get and the dot selected by the participant (leftward errors were nega tive). 
Thus, if the center dot (orange) matched the target and the participant se-
lected the dot farthest to the left (black), the resultant error would be —10 
mm. Note that because the end choices never matched the target on test 
trials, the largest possible error was ±15 mm. Control and practice trials 
were not included in any analyses.
Given that choice response errors were categorical (±15 mm, ±10 mm, 
±5 mm, or 0 mm) whereas draw response errors were continuous, draw er-
rors were converted to categorical values. Specifi cally, values were round-
ed to the nearest 5 mm and truncated to ± 15 mm. Statistical analyses re-
vealed no signifi cant differences between continuous and categorical draw 
errors. Thus, the categorical draw errors were used in all analyses.
Results
Figure 3 shows mean errors for both response types separately 
for children (Figure 3A) and adults (Figure 3B). In general, errors 
were smallest near the center of the rectangle (100-mm location) 
and were biased away from the center and the left and right edges. 
For instance, at 75 mm, participants made relatively large errors 
to the left (negative values), and errors decreased as locations ap-
proached 100 mm. Conversely, beyond 100 mm, errors were right-
ward (positive values) and increased as they approached 125 mm. 
Finally, adults’ errors were generally smaller than 7-year-olds’ er-
rors despite the fact that adults had to remember the target location 
for a longer delay (10 s vs. 5 s for the 7-year-olds), and both age 
groups showed smaller errors on choice response trials than draw 
response trials.
To analyze these data, we conducted a three-way analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) with response type (choice or draw) and lo-
cation (25–175 mm) as within-subject factors and age (7 years or 
adult) as a between-subjects factor. This analysis revealed signif-
icant main effects of location, Wilks’s Λ = .23, F(12,47) = 12.80, 
p < .001, and response type, Wilks’s Λ = .86, F(1, 58) = 9.54, p 
< .01. Additionally, there was a signifi cant Location × Age inter-
action, Wilks’s Λ = .62, F(12, 47) = 2.43, p < .05; a signifi cant 
Response Type × Location interaction, Wilks’s Λ = .38, F(12, 
47) = 6.53, p < .001; and a signifi cant Response Type × Location 
× Age interaction, Wilks’s Λ = .60, F(12, 47) = 2.70, p < .01.
To explore these results further, we separately conducted sim-
ple effects tests for the adults and the 7-year-olds. Tests of simple 
effects for the children showed a signifi cant main effect of loca-
tion, F(12, 348) = 9.06, p < .001, and a signifi cant Response 
Type × Location interaction, F(12, 348) = 4.49, p < .001.
1 Huttenlocher et al. (1994) also used locations 12.5 mm and 187.5 mm 
from the left edge of the card. These locations were not used as targets 
here because they did not allow enough room for the choices presented on 
the choice response cards.
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Additional tests of simple effects revealed a signifi cant effect of 
location for both choice responses, F(12, 348) = 3.35, p < .001, 
and draw responses, F(12, 348) = 8.51, p < .001. Thus, the posi-
tive and negative deviations across locations apparent in Fig ure 
3A for both choice and draw responses were statistically reliable. 
Furthermore, there were signifi cant differences in error across re-
sponse type at fi ve locations: 25 mm, F(1, 29) = 17.91, p < .001; 
62.5 mm, F(1, 29) = 4.28, p < .05; 75 mm, F(1, 29) = 9.26, p < 
.01; 87.5 mm, F(1, 29) = 5.01, p < .05; and 175 mm, F(1, 29) = 
15.03, p < .001 (see locations marked with arrows in Figure 3A). 
At all of these locations, draw errors were signifi cantly larger than 
choice errors.
Simple effects tests for adults showed signifi cant main effects of 
both response type, F(1, 29) = 10.59, p < .01, and location, F(12, 
348) = 5.61, p < .001, as well as a signifi cant Response Type × 
Location interaction, F(12, 348) = 2.88, p < .01. Additional tests 
of simple effects revealed a signifi cant effect of location for both 
choice responses, F(12, 348) = 2.64, p < .01, and draw responses, 
F(12, 348) = 5.56, p < .001. As with the 7-year-olds, the positive 
and negative deviations across locations apparent in Figure 3B for 
both choice and draw responses were statistically reliable. More-
over, there were signifi cant effects of response type at four loca-
tions: 50 mm, F(1, 29) = 7.28, p < .05; 87.5 mm, F(1, 29) = 10.76, 
p < .01; 150 mm, F(1, 29) = 12.43, p < .01; and 175 mm, F(1, 29) 
= 14.43, p < .01 (see locations marked with arrows in Figure 3B). 
As with the 7-year-olds, draw errors were larger than choice errors 
for three of these locations. The difference at 150 mm was caused 
by errors in opposite directions across response types.
Figure 3. Mean choice and draw errors for (A) 7-year-olds (7yr) and (B) adults (AD) across the 13 target 
locations in Experiment 1. Positive values indicate rightward errors, and negative values indicate leftward 
errors. Arrows indicate locations at which response types differed signifi cantly. Errors bars refl ect plus or 
minus one standard error.
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Polynomial curve-fi tting. In general, our data followed the same 
sinusoidal trend reported by Huttenlocher et al. (1994). To veri-
fy this result, we fi t polynomial curves to the data from each re-
sponse type and each age group separately (see also Hutten locher 
et al., 1994). Table 1 shows multiple correlation squared (R2) val-
ues for the fi ts of quintic, cubic, and linear functions separately 
for each age and response type as well as signifi cant differences 
in the fi ts of these curves. As with data from Hutten locher et al. 
(1994), we found the best fi t for children’s draw responses was 
obtained by a quintic function, although the fi t of the cubic func-
tion was also quite good.2 For adults’ draw data, both quintic and 
cubic functions fi t well, although only the fi t of the cubic function 
was signifi cantly better than chance (the fi t of the quintic func-
tion was marginal). The cubic function also fi t signifi cantly bet-
ter than a linear function. Thus, both sets of curve fi ts for the draw 
responses showed sinusoidal patterns similar to those reported by 
Huttenlocher et al. (1994). The difference in fi ts between the age 
groups likely refl ects adults’ more accurate re sponses, particular-
ly at the edges of the stimulus set, which would affect the fi t of a 
quintic function.
Because a verbal, recognition-based response has not been ex-
amined in this type of task, it is important to investigate whether 
these responses show the same sinusoidal pattern. If so, it would 
suggest that similar processes underlie sensorimotor, recall-based 
and verbal, recognition-based spatial memory errors. This was not 
the case for children’s choice responses. As can be seen in Table 
1, there were no signifi cant effects among the fi ts of quintic, cu-
bic, and linear functions. Thus, there may be different process-
es un derlying the generation of verbal versus pointing respons-
es at 7 years of age. For adults’ choice data, a quintic function fi t 
signifi cantly better than a linear function, and all three functions 
fi t adults’ choice data signifi cantly better than chance. This fi nd-
ing suggests that, although adults were signifi cantly more accu-
rate in the choice task, similar processes underlie the generation 
of both types of response for this age group.
According to the CA and DFT models, the sinusoidal pattern 
evident in participants’ responses is caused by systematic distor-
tions in memory that reach their peak near locations of 25, 75, 
125, and 175 mm (the infl ection points of the polynomial curves). 
This allows us to bring together results from the ANOVA and 
curve fi ts. Specifi cally, the locations at which response types dif-
fered (see Figure 3) were generally near the infl ection points of 
the polyno mial curves for both children and adults.
Table 1 
R2 Values of Polynomial Curve Fits in Experiment 1
Response               Quintic function Cubic function Linear function
7-year-olds’ draw .912a >> .727 a > .011
7-year-olds’ choice .453 .343 .163
Adults’ draw .699 b .643 a > .041
Adults’ choice .912 a .631 a .392 a
Note. Quintic functions marked with >> fi t signifi cantly better (p < .05) 
than both cubic, FS(2, 7) > 4.74, and linear, FS(4, 7) > 4.12, functions. 
Quintic functions marked with > fi t signifi cantly better than only a lin-
ear function. Cubic functions marked with > fi t signifi cantly better than 
linear functions, FS(2, 9) > 4.26.
a Curve fi ts signifi cantly greater than chance, quintic FS(5,7) > 3.97, cubic 
FS(3, 9) > 3.86, and linear FS (1, 11) > 4.84.   
b Curve fi t marginally better than chance, F(5, 7) = 3.25, p = .078.
Percentage of correct responses on choice trials. In addition to 
assessing the magnitude of error on choice trials, we evaluated the 
frequency of correct choices. A  t  test comparing the mean per-
centage of correct responses across the two age groups revealed 
a signifi cant difference, t(58) = –5.90, p < .001. Adults were cor-
rect more often on choice trials (M = 56.9%) than children were 
(M = 30.0%). Additionally, t tests comparing the perfor mance of 
each group to chance (20%) indicated that both age groups per-
formed at levels signifi cantly above chance: children, t(29) = 3.78, 
p < .01; adults, t(29) = 9.93, p < .001.
Discussion
As in Huttenlocher et al.’s (1994) study, both children’s and 
adults’ draw responses were biased away from the edges and the 
midline of the rectangle. This sinusoidal pattern is consistent with 
both the DFT and CA models and suggests that draw responses 
for both ages are driven by the same underlying process (see also 
Spencer & Hund, 2003). By contrast, choice responses did not 
consistently follow this pattern. There were signifi cantly smaller 
errors on the choice task for both age groups at locations near the 
infl ection points of the sinusoidal draw pattern. More striking, the 
7-year-olds’ choice responses were not signifi cantly fi t by either 
quintic or cubic functions. Two factors might explain these differ-
ences across response types and age groups.
The fi rst reason why children and adults might rely less on geo-
metric category information in the choice task is because there is 
a bias to use nonspatial information when a verbal response is re-
quired. Many verbal statements about objects in the local sur round 
emphasize nonspatial information such as object features. For 
young children who are still mastering language, it may be less 
apparent that geometric category information is useful in a verbal 
response task. Consequently, they may rely primarily on their met-
ric memory when selecting from the set of colored choices. Data 
from a study by Plumert and Nichols-Whitehead (1996) are con-
sistent with this view. When asked to give directions about how to 
fi nd a hidden object in a dollhouse, 3- and 4-year-olds were more 
likely to offer information about the features of a nearby object 
(e.g., the shoe is hidden under the hat with the blue ribbon) rather 
than information about locations (e.g., the shoe is hidden under the 
hat next to the rocking chair). Adults, by contrast, tended to refer 
to both object features and spatial relations. This is consistent with 
results from the present study in which children showed little evi-
dence of geometric bias in the choice task whereas adults showed 
a sinusoidal pattern that was weaker than in the draw task.
A second reason why both age groups showed smaller errors on 
the choice task is that the added spatial structure provided by the 
choice dots helped participants generate more accurate respons-
es. Consider, for instance, how one might account for choice re-
sponses by using the DFT. According to this model, activation in 
SWM drifts away from reference axes during delays, and recall
2 Because Huttenlocher et al. (1994, Experiment 6) did not round 
and truncate their data, we analyzed the continuous draw data to allow 
for a direct comparison with the results found in this study. Huttenlo-
cher et al. reported that a quintic function provided the best fi t to their 
data (R2 = .90). This fi t is comparable to the fi t of a quintic function to 
children’s contin uous draw data in the present experiment (R2 = .83).
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responses are generated by pointing to the location associated 
with maximal activation. In the choice task, it is possible that peo-
ple use a similar process—they pick the choice that most closely 
matches the location associated with maximal activation in work-
ing mem ory. This would produce identical errors across response 
types provided that there is a choice dot in the spatial location cur-
rently represented in working memory. If, however, there were 
substan tial drift in working memory—as occurs near the infl ec-
tion points of the sinusoidal pattern—it is possible that none of 
the choices would overlap with the remembered location. In this 
case, partic ipants might pick the closest match or simply guess. 
This would result in smaller errors on the choice task provided 
that the choices clustered close to the target location (i.e., the spa-
tial span was small). On average, this was the case in the present 
experiment, given that the fi ve choices were separated by 5 mm, 
and the correct choice was constrained to be the second, third, or 
fourth dot. We tested competing predictions of these alternative 
accounts in Ex periment 2.
Experiment 2
During the choice trials of Experiment 1, participants se lected 
from a set of fi ve choices separated by 5 mm. To test the compet-
ing predictions of the verbal bias and choice span ac counts, we 
increased the number of choices from fi ve to nine (the choices 
remained separated by 5 mm). Thus, the choices now covered a 
40-mm spatial span instead of 20 mm. If par ticipants have a bias 
against using geometric category informa tion in verbal tasks, this 
manipulation should have no effect relative to Experiment 1. If, 
however, the improved perfor mance on choice trials in Experi-
ment 1 was caused by a mismatch between a drifting memory and 
a nonoverlapping and more accurate choice set, then this manip-
ulation should make choice responses more similar to draw re-
sponses.
Method
Participants. Participants were 30 seven-year-olds {M age = 7.57 
years, SD = 1.05 months) and 31 adults (M age = 18.76 years, SD = 9.89 
months). Data from 2 additional children were excluded, 1 because she 
did not complete the task, and 1 because his draw responses were not clear 
enough to be coded. All other participant details were as in Experiment 1.
Apparatus. All details of the apparatus were the same as in Experiment 
1 except for the choice response cards. These cards had nine choices (rath-
er than fi ve) presented 5 mm apart and covering a 40-mm span. To keep 
the choices verbally identifi able, different colored squares and triangles 
were used. From left to right, the symbols were a black square, a green tri-
angle, a red square, a blue triangle, an orange square, a black triangle, a 
green square, a red triangle, and a blue square. Participants were asked to 
say both the color and the symbol type on the choice trials.
Procedure. All procedural details were the same as in Experiment 1.
Experimental design. As in Experiment 1, the locations used for prac-
tice and control trials were randomly selected from locations in between 
the target locations (6.25 mm). Targets were presented at only 11 loca-
tions—the 25-mm and 175-mm locations were not used because there 
was not enough room to include nine choices between the target and the 
edge of the card. We also increased the number of control trials to eight 
to further reduce the likelihood that participants might adopt a strategy 
in which they avoided selecting the two end choices. In Experiment 1, 7-
year-olds’ percentage of correct responses on test trials was signifi cantly 
above chance. This was not the case, however, on control trials (when end 
choices were correct), t(29) = 0.92, p = .36, suggesting that the children 
might have been strategically avoiding the end choices. For comparison, 
adults performed signifi cantly above chance on both test and control tri-
als, t(29) = 7.12, p < .001.
Method of analysis. Choice responses were coded using the method de-
scribed in Experiment 1. However, because the choices now covered a 
greater spatial span, the maximum error was ±35 mm. Continuous draw 
responses were coded as in Experiment 1. Categorical draw errors were 
rounded to the nearest 5 mm and truncated to ±35 mm (rather than to 
± 15 mm as in Experiment 1). Again, statistical comparisons revealed no 
sig nifi cant differences between continuous and categorical draw errors. 
Thus, categorical draw errors were used in all analyses.
Results
Figure 4 shows mean errors for both response types separate-
ly for children (Figure 4A) and adults (Figure 4B). Responses fol-
lowed the sinusoidal pattern seen in Experiment 1, with small er-
rors at the center of the rectangle (100 mm) and near the centers 
of each half (50 mm and 150 mm). In contrast to Experiment 1, 
however, errors on both choice and draw trials showed a clear si-
nusoidal pattern for both age groups. These data were analyzed 
using a three-way ANOVA with response type (choice or draw) 
and location (37.5–162.5 mm) as within-subject factors and age 
(7 years or adult) as a between-subjects factor. This analysis re-
vealed a signifi cant main effect of location, Wilks’s Λ = .34, F(10, 
50) = 9.56, p < .001. There were no signifi cant effects of response 
type or age. These data strongly suggest that the same processes 
un derlie the generation of both verbal and pointing responses in 
this task. However, considered together with Experiment 1, it is 
likely that the details of the response context (e.g., spatial span of 
choices) matter as well.
To examine this issue directly, we compared the choice and 
draw responses across experiments. Specifi cally, for each response 
type we conducted an ANOVA with location (37.5–162.5 mm) as 
a within-subject factor and age (7 years or adult) and experiment 
(1 or 2) as between-subjects factors. Because we used a subset of 
data from each experiment, we report only signifi cant effects of 
experiment. Note that the data from trials to the two extreme target 
locations in Experiment 1 were excluded from these analyses. The 
ANOVA examining draw responses across experiments revealed 
no signifi cant experiment effects. Thus, as expected, draw errors 
were comparable across experiments. By contrast, the ANOVA 
comparing choice responses revealed a signifi cant Location × Ex-
periment interaction, F(10, 1170) = 2.24, p < .05. Simple effects 
tests comparing choice responses in Experiments 1 and 2 at each 
location separately revealed a signifi cant effect of experiment at 
two locations near the infl ection points of the sinusoidal pat tern—
at 75 mm (Experiment 1: M = 0.00, Experiment 2: M = –3.21), 
F(1, 119) = 5.01, p < .05, and 137.5 mm (Experiment 1: M = 0.92, 
Experiment 2: M = 3.69), F(1, 119) = 4.56, p < .05. At both loca-
tions, errors were larger in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1.
Polynomial curve-fi tting. Although the data in Figure 4 show 
a clear sinusoidal pattern, it was important to verify this statisti-
cally. Table 2 shows R2 values for the fi ts of quintic, cubic, and 
linear functions fi t separately for each age and response type as 
well as signifi cant differences in the fi ts of these curves. Across all 
four sets of analyses, quintic and cubic functions provided excel-
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lent fi ts to the data. Relative to Experiment 1, the polynomial 
trends in 7-year-olds’ draw responses3 and adults’ choice and draw 
responses were comparable, although these trends were stronger 
in the present experiment. Moreover, 7-year-olds showed a strong 
polynomial trend in their choice responses in the present experi-
ment but not in Experiment 1.
Percentage of correct responses on choice trials. A t test com-
paring the mean percentage of correct responses across the two age 
groups revealed a signifi cant difference for children and adults, 
t(59) = –6.66, p < .001. As in Experiment 1, adults (M = 48.4%) 
were correct more often than children (M = 16.4%). Additionally, 
t tests comparing the performance of each group to chance perfor-
mance (11%) indicated that both age groups per formed at levels 
signifi cantly above chance: children, t(29) =2.13, p < .01; adults, 
t(30) = 9.23, p < .001.
Discussion
The present experiment tested competing predictions of two 
accounts of the smaller errors on choice trials in Experiment 1.
3 Again, to compare with the fi ndings of Huttenlocher et al. 
(1994, Experiment 6), we fi t curves to the continuous draw data. 
The fi t of a quintic function to children’s continuous draw data in 
the present experi ment was excellent (R2 = .96). This fi t was high-
er than the fi t reported by Huttenlocher et al. (R2 = .90).
Figure 4. Mean choice and draw errors for (A) 7-year-olds (7yr) and (B) adults (AD) across the 11 target 
locations in Experiment 2. Positive values indicate rightward errors, and negative values indicate leftward 
errors. Errors bars refl ect plus or minus one standard error.
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Table 2 
R2 Values of Polynomial Curve Fits in Experiment 2
Response               Quintic function Cubic function Linear function
7-year-olds’ draw .946a >> .800 a > .017
7-year-olds’ choice .912a > .875a > .025
Adults’ draw .930a > .880a > .291
Adults’ choice .959a > .892a > .444a
Note.  Quintic functions marked with >> fi t signifi cantly better (p < .05) 
than both cubic, FS(2, 5) > 5.79, and linear, FS(4, 5) > 5.19, functions. 
Quintic functions marked with > fi t signifi cantly better than only a lin-
ear function. Cubic functions marked with > fi t signifi cantly better than 
linear functions; FS(2, 7) > 4.74.
a Curve fi ts signifi cantly greater than chance, quintic FS (5, 5) > 5.05, cubic 
FS(3, 7) > 4.35, and linear FS(1, 9) > 5.12.
Results are not consistent with the proposal that children were bi-
ased against using geometric information in verbal tasks. Rather, 
results support the proposal that the spatial span of the choice set 
limited participants’ choice response errors in the previous exper-
iment. Choice and draw responses in the present experiment did 
not differ signifi cantly, and responses from both trial types showed 
a strong and signifi cant sinusoidal pattern. It is important to note 
that this was the case for both children and adults, suggesting de-
velopmental continuity in the processes that underlie perfor mance 
in this task (see also Spencer & Hund, 2003).
The present results demonstrate that geometric biases are not 
unique to sensorimotor responses in spatial recall tasks. This has 
important implications for the CA and DFT models: It suggests 
that the processes captured by these models might generalize to 
verbal responses in recognition tasks. Before these implications 
were evaluated in detail, however, it was fi rst necessary to address 
one fi nal empirical issue. To test the choice span account in the 
present experiment, we increased the number of choices from fi ve 
to nine. This increased the spatial span of the choice set, but it also 
increased the number of options from which participants had to 
choose. Consequently, the increase in geometric bias on choice tri-
als might have resulted from the increased spatial span or a gen-
eral increase in task diffi culty. We tested these possibilities in Ex-
periment 3.
Experiment 3
To determine whether the different pattern of results on choice 
trials across Experiments 1 and 2 was driven by the number of 
choices or the spatial span of the choices, we used a choice re-
sponse set with fi ve choices (as in Experiment 1) covering a 40-
mm span (as in Experiment 2). If the number of choices caused 
the differences across experiments, then the results of Experiment 
3 should be similar to those of Experiment 1; that is, choice and 
draw responses should differ signifi cantly. Alternatively, if the 
spatial span of the choices caused the differences across experi-
ments, then the results of Experiment 3 should be similar to those 
of Experiment 2; that is, we should fi nd similar patterns of error 
on both choice and draw trials.
Method
Participants. Participants were 30 seven-year-olds (M age = 7.55 
years, SD = 0.96 months) and 30 adults (M age = 19.54 years, SD = 11.97 
months). All other participant details were the same as in Experiments 1 
and 2.
Apparatus. All details of the apparatus were the same as in Experiment 
1 except for the choice response cards. These cards had fi ve choices, sepa-
rated by 10 mm (rather than 5 mm).
Procedure and experimental design. The procedure and design were 
identical to those used in Experiment 2.
Method of analysis. Choice responses were coded using the method de-
scribed in Experiment 1. Choices covered the same spatial range as in Ex-
periment 2, but now errors could occur only in 10-mm increments (the 
distance between two choices). As a result, the maximum error was ±30 
mm. Continuous draw error was coded the same way as in the previous 
experiments. Categorical draw error was calculated by rounding the con-
tinuous draw errors to 10 mm and truncating to ±30 mm. As in Experi-
ments 1 and 2, statistical analyses revealed no signifi cant differences be-
tween continuous and categorical draw errors, so categorical draw errors 
were used in all analyses.
Results
Figure 5 shows mean errors for both response types separately 
for children (Figure 5A) and adults (Figure 5B). Responses gen-
erally followed a sinusoidal pattern as in Experiments 1 and 2, 
with small errors at the center of the rectangle (100 mm) and near 
the centers of each half (50 mm and 150 mm). In addition, adults’ 
errors were noticeably smaller than 7-year-olds’ errors, as in Ex-
periment 1 but not Experiment 2.
A three-way ANOVA with response type (choice or draw) and 
location (37.5–162.5 mm) as within-subject factors and age (7 
years or adult) as a between-subjects factor revealed a signifi -
cant main effect of location, Wilks’s Λ = .59, F(10, 49) = 3.38, 
p < .01, and a signifi cant Location × Age interaction, Wilks’s Λ 
= .69, F(10, 49) = 2.23, p < .05. As in Experiment 2, there were 
no signifi cant effects of response type. Adults’ errors were gener-
ally smaller than children’s across the sinusoidal pattern, although 
tests of simple effects showed a signifi cant effect of age only at 
one location, 50 mm, F(1, 58) = 4.82, p < .05. Additional tests of 
simple effects indicated that there was a signifi cant modulation of 
error across locations for 7-year-olds, F(10, 290) = 3.36, p < .001, 
and adults, F(10, 290) = 5.40, p < .001.
The central goal of Experiment 3 was to compare response errors 
on the choice trials in the present experiment with perfor mance 
when participants chose from (a) the same number of choices over 
a small spatial span (Experiment 1) and (b) more choices over the 
same spatial span (Experiment 2). To examine the effects of spatial 
span, we compared the choice responses in Experiments 1 and 3 
in a three-way ANOVA with location (37.5–162.5 mm) as a with-
in-subject factor and age (7 years or adult) and experiment (1 or 
3) as between-subjects factors. We report only signifi cant effects 
of experiment. The ANOVA revealed a signifi cant Location × Ex-
periment interaction, F(10, 1160) = 2.53, p < .01. Tests of simple 
effects indicated that responses at two loca tions differed signifi -
cantly across experiments: 75 mm, F(1, 118) = 3.95, p < .05, and 
137.5 mm, F(1, 118) = 4.47, p < .05. At both of these locations, er-
rors were larger in the present experiment than in Experiment 1. 
It is important to note that these locations are near the infl ection 
points of the sinusoidal pattern. Next, we examined the infl uence 
of the number of choices by comparing the choice responses in 
Experiments 2 and 3 in a three-way ANOVA. There were no sig-
nifi cant effects of experiment. These analyses, in conjunction with 
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the absence of signifi  cant response type effects in the present ex-
periment, suggest that spatial span—and not the number of choic-
es—is a central contrib utor to geometric effects in the choice task.
Polynomial curve-fi tting. As in the previous experiments, we 
fi t polynomial curves to participants’ responses. Table 3 shows R2 
values for the fi ts of quintic, cubic, and linear functions fi t sepa-
rately for each age and response type as well as signifi cant differ-
ences in the fi ts of these curves. As in Experiments 1 and 2, the 
best fi t for children’s draw data was obtained by a quintic func-
tion, though the fi t of the cubic function was also quite good.4 The 
same was true of adults’ draw responses. For children’s choice 
data, there was no signifi cant difference between the fi ts of quin-
tic, cubic, and linear functions, and none of these functions fi t chil-
dren’s responses signifi cantly above chance levels. By contrast, 
cubic and linear functions fi t adults’ choice data at levels that were 
signifi cantly better than chance. This pattern of results is similar to 
that seen in Experiment 1, raising the possibility that, although the 
number of choices did not emerge as an important factor on the
4 Again, to compare with the fi ndings of Huttenlocher et al. (1994, 
Experiment 6), we fi t curves to our continuous draw data. The fi t of 
a quintic function to children’s continuous draw data in the present 
experi ment was quite good (R2 = .92) and comparable to results from 
Hutten locher et al.
Figure 5. Mean choice and draw errors for (A) 7-year-olds (7yr) and (B) adults (AD) across the 11 target 
locations in Experiment 3. Positive values indicate rightward errors, and negative values indicate leftward 
errors. Errors bars refl ect plus or minus one standard error.
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Table 3 
R2 Values of Polynomial Curve Fits in Experiment 3
Response               Quintic function Cubic function Linear function
7-year-olds’ draw .957a >> .804 a > .001
7-year-olds’ choice .605 .374 .084
Adults’ draw .945a >> .741a  .460
Adults’ choice .780 .770a  .496a
Note.  Quintic functions marked with >> fi t signifi cantly better (p < .05) 
than both cubic, FS(2, 5) > 5.79, and linear, FS(4, 5) > 5.19, functions. 
Quintic functions marked with > fi t signifi cantly better than only a lin-
ear function. Cubic functions marked with > fi t signifi cantly better than 
linear functions, FS(2, 7) > 4.74.
a Curve fi ts signifi cantly greater than chance, quintic FS(5, 5) > 5.05, cubic 
FS(3, 7) > 4.35, and linear FS(1, 9) > 5.12.
basis of the cross-experiment ANOVAs above, this task factor may 
play some role in choice responses. Note, however, that children 
and adults made very small errors to one target location on the 
choice task—125 mm. Responses to all other targets showed rela-
tively close correspondence across tasks. Given that curve fi ts take 
into account only mean responses (thus, we had relatively few de-
grees of freedom), the reduction in error at 125 mm likely played a 
substantial role in the nonsignifi cant quintic fi ts. In this context, it 
is worth noting that the fi t of the quintic function approached sig-
nifi cance for the children (.605; see Table 3) and was higher than 
the quintic fi t from Experiment 1 (.453).
Percentage of correct responses on choice trials. In a fi nal set 
of analyses, we examined the percentage of correct responses on 
choice trials. A t test comparing the mean percentage of correct 
responses across the two age groups revealed a signifi cant differ-
ence, t(58) = –8.03, p < .001. As in the previous experiments, 
adults (M = 73.0%) were correct more often than children (M = 
35.8%). Additionally, t tests comparing the performance of each 
age group to chance (20%) indicated that both groups performed 
at levels signifi cantly above chance: children, t(29) = 4.45, p < 
.001; adults, t(29) = 17.66, p < .001. It is interesting that the per-
centage of correct responses in the present experiment was notice-
ably higher than in Experiment 1 (adults: M = 56.9%, children: 
M = 30.0%), despite the fact that both experiments included the 
same number of choices. To examine this issue directly, we con-
ducted a two-way ANOVA with age (7 years or adult) and experi-
ment (1 or 3) as between-subjects factors. This analysis revealed a 
signifi cant main effect of experiment, F(1, 116) = 11.29, p < .001. 
Partici pants in Experiment 3 (M = 54.4%) were correct signifi -
cantly more often than in Experiment 1 (M = 43.5%). Considered 
to gether with mean error on the choice trials, these results indicate 
how spatial span affects response error in the choice task: Spatial 
span makes choices more distinctive as evidenced by the higher 
percentage of correct responses, but there is a cost of this distinc-
tiveness—when participants err, they make large geometric errors 
that are consistent with biases in the draw task.
Discussion
This experiment examined whether the spatial span of the choic-
es or the number of choices drove the substantial geometric biases 
in the choice task of Experiment 2. Results suggest that the spa-
tial span of the choices played a major role in this fi nding. We saw 
comparable geometric biases across choice and draw re sponses 
in the current experiment. Moreover, cross-experiment compari-
sons showed a signifi cant increase in error on the choice task at 
the infl ection points of the sinusoidal pattern in this exper iment 
relative to Experiment 1 and no signifi cant differences in error 
on the choice task across Experiments 2 and 3. These results lend 
strong support for the choice span account discussed previ ously. 
By that view, participants in the choice task select the choice that 
most closely matches where memory has drifted during the delay. 
With a larger spatial span, it is more likely that a choice will over-
lap with where memory has drifted, even when there are relatively 
few choices from which to pick.
Although our results suggest that the spatial span of the choices 
is critical, the number of choices does seem to play a role as well. 
Participants selected the correct choice more often when there 
were fewer choices (i.e., in Experiments 1 and 3 vs. Experiment 
2), particularly when the choices were farther apart (Experiment 
3). This latter effect was likely caused by the spatial distinctive-
ness of the choices. It is important to note, however, that we still 
found evidence of geometric biases on the choice task despite the 
small number of choices from which to select. One fi nal collection 
of results contributes to this distinctiveness story: Adults showed 
signifi cantly smaller errors than 7-year-olds in the present exper-
iment, and they showed a dramatic increase in percentage of cor-
rect responses relative to Experiment 1. This fi nding suggests that 
adults capitalized on the distinctiveness of the choices more so 
than did children. This is consistent with recent proposals that the 
spatial precision of spatial memory increases systematically over 
development (e.g., Hund & Plumert, 2002; Schutte et al., 2003; 
Spencer & Hund, 2003). We discuss these fi ndings in greater de-
tail below.
General Discussion
The purpose of this study was to examine the nature of the mem-
ory system that underlies performance when people use spa tial 
memory to form different response types in the presence of dif-
ferent response cues. In particular, we asked whether one type of 
bias—geometric bias—observed in spatial recall tasks with point-
ing responses generalizes to a recognition task with a verbal re-
sponse. If so, it would suggest that the processes that produce geo-
metric biases—processes formalized in models of spatial re call—
might be general as well.
Across three experiments, our results clearly show that geomet-
ric biases generalize to verbal responses in a recognition task. 
This was most clearly shown in Experiment 2, in which both 
children and adults showed robust geometric biases across 
the draw and choice tasks. However, we also found evidence 
that the structure of the choice set contributes to the errors par-
ticipants make in the verbal task. For both age groups, geomet-
ric biases in the verbal task were robust in Experiment 2 with a 
large spatial span and nine choices, weaker in Experiment 3 with 
a large span and fewer choices, and the weakest in Experiment 
1 with a small span and only fi ve choices. These choice depen-
dencies were most dramatic for the 7-year-olds, who showed lit-
tle evidence of geometric bias in Experiment 1. It is important to 
note, however, that deviations between choice and draw responses 
were systematic for both age groups—choice responses were con-
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sistently smaller near the in fl ection points of the sinusoidal pat-
tern. Spatial span also infl uenced participants’ percentage of cor-
rect responses. Percentage of correct responses was higher in Ex-
periment 3 relative to Experi ment 1, suggesting that, particular-
ly for adults, the spatial distinc-tiveness of the choices matters.
It is important to note that the choice task we used here dif-
fered in multiple ways from the spatial recall task. First, we asked 
participants to verbally label locations rather than to point—a re-
sponse difference common in tasks that contrast the “cognitive” 
and “sensorimotor” systems described above (e.g., Bridgeman et 
al., 2000; Brungart et al., 2000). Second, the choice task required 
recognition of the correct location from a set of simultaneously 
viewable alternatives, rather than recall of the location in an emp-
ty rectangle. Although our experiments did not isolate the different 
contributions of these factors, results demonstrate that geometric 
biases generalize across these differences. The next challenge is 
to explain how the different factors may have contributed to both 
the generalization of bias across tasks and the subtle differences 
that emerged over development as we manipulated the choice set. 
We contend that formal models can help meet this challenge by 
spec ifying not only whether different factors contributed to perfor-
mance but also how. Thus, in the sections that follow, we evaluate 
two central issues. First, given that geometric biases generalized 
to the choice task, can the CA and DFT models account for our re-
sults, and do these models offer insights into the factors that give 
rise to both the presence and absence of geometric biases across 
experiments? Second, what are the implications of these results 
for views that posit two spatial memory systems and discontinu-
ous changes in spatial abilities over development?
Models of Spatial Recall and Geometric Bias in the 
Choice Task
The CA model. According to the CA model, geometric biases 
arise because people weight prototypical information more heavi-
ly than less certain fi ne-grained information after short-term delays 
(Huttenlocher et al., 1991; Spencer & Hund, 2002). How might 
these ideas be applied to the choice task? Central to this question 
is how people use the choice set, that is, how people combine fi ne-
grained, categorical, and choice information to form a re sponse. 
One possibility is that people use only fi ne-grained and choice in-
formation when generating a response in the verbal task. This idea 
stems from the proposal discussed earlier that geometric informa-
tion might be less relevant (or simply used less often) in verbal 
tasks. Results from Experiment 2 demonstrate that this is not the 
case in all situations. What might determine when to use categori-
cal information? One likely factor is the certainty of the choice 
set. With many choices present (Experiment 2), choice-related 
spatial information would be less certain, and participants might 
weight prototypical information more heavily. It is impor tant to 
note, however, that this idea does not appear to capture differences 
between Experiments 1 and 3. When the choices were more dis-
tinctive (Experiment 3), which would presumably lead to greater 
certainty, we saw stronger geometric biases, not the reverse.
Another possibility is that certainty scales only with the number 
of choices and not the spatial range. In this case, the weighting of 
the three types of information would be the same in Experiments 
1 and 3. What, then, might explain the different outcomes in these 
experiments? It is possible that these outcomes refl ect the cost of 
discretization error in the two situations, that is, error resulting 
from mapping continuous spatial information onto a discrete re-
sponse set. For instance, when participants were deciding between 
two adjacent choices in Experiments 1 and 3, categorical informa-
tion could occasionally tip the balance in favor of a geometrically 
biased choice. It is important that the cost of making such a choice 
would be different in the two experiments—5 mm in Experiment 
1 versus 10 mm in Experiment 3. Thus, the same weighting pro-
cess could produce larger geometric biases in Experiment 3 sim-
ply because of the structure of the choice set.
Although these ideas are promising, implementing them in the 
CA model is not straightforward. For instance, adding a third cue 
to the model with a particular weighting strength would tend to 
produce responses in between the options in the choice set. This, 
of course, never occurs in experiment. There are at least two ways 
to handle this. First, one could implement a postweighting stage 
that discretizes the continuous spatial response, mapping space to 
the most appropriately positioned color in the task space. A second 
possibility is that weighting occurs in a two-stage process (for a 
sequential view of spatial language use, see Carlson-Radvansky & 
Logan, 1997; Logan & Sadler, 1996). First, fi ne-grained and cat-
egorical information is weighted on the basis of certainty of the 
fi ne-grained information. This would produce a best guess of the 
remembered location along continuous spatial dimensions. Then, 
this response could be discretized by combining it with the choice 
set in a winner-take-all fashion. Both of these seem like reason-
able additions to the CA model; however, they highlight the need 
to formally consider the nature of recognition responses within 
this modeling framework.
A fi nal question is whether the CA model can capture the de-
velopmental changes we observed. As with several other stud-
ies in the spatial recall literature, we found that children gen-
erally showed larger geometric errors in the draw task than did 
adults (Huttenlocher et al., 1994; Plumert & Hund, 2001; Spen-
cer & Hund, 2003). This fi nding might indicate that children have 
a less accurate fi ne-grained representation of the target location 
(Hund & Plumert, 2002; Huttenlocher et al., 1994). Consequently, 
they weight categorical information more heavily. It is interesting, 
however, that adults showed a more consistent use of categorical 
information in the verbal task across experiments. This fi ts with 
a recent proposal by Hund and Plumert (2002). These research-
ers proposed that adults show robust categorical biases in differ-
ent situations because they have learned over development that the 
use of categorical information leads to an overall reduction in re-
sponse error. Similarly, Huttenlocher, Hedges, and Vevea (2000) 
placed the CA model in a Bayesian framework in which the use of 
categorical information in adulthood leads to an optimal trade-off 
between bias and variable error.
The DFT. The starting point for a dynamic fi eld account of the 
data presented here was discussed previously: Participants might 
pick the choice that most closely matches the location to which 
memory has drifted after the delay. Recent ideas proposed by Wil-
imzig and Schöner (2005, 2006) to capture categorical re sponding 
with the DFT allow us to make this idea more concrete. Figure 6 
shows simulations of a dynamic fi eld model performing the choice 
task (note that this model is a simplifi cation of our more gener-
al theory of SWM described by Spencer and colleagues: Spen-
cer et al., in press; Spencer & Schöner, 2006). Two fi elds are dis-
played within each panel—an SWM fi eld (uswm) and an exci-
486                                             Spencer, Simmering, & Schutte: TOWARD A FORMAL THEORY OF FLEXIBLE SPATIAL BEHAVIOR
tatory long-term memory fi eld (ultm). All of the simulations in Fig-
ure 6 show performance when the target is presented at a single 
location, 25 mm to the right of midline (midline was at Unit 150 
and Target 125 was at Unit 225; thus, 5 units along the x-axes 
are equivalent to 1 mm in the task space). We selected this loca-
tion because we saw large differences between choice and draw 
re sponses near 75 and 125 mm in the present study. Note that as 
a fi nal simplifi cation, reference-related long-term memory inputs 
around the midline axis were captured by static excitatory and in-
hibitory inputs (in contrast to the dynamic long-term memory in-
puts in Spencer et al., in press; Spencer & Schöner, 2006).
As a fi rst step toward describing the full set of simulation re-
sults in Figure 6, consider what is depicted in each individual 
simula tion. Each simulation begins with the presentation of a tar-
get 25 mm to the right of midline. This target-related input creates 
a peak of activation at the target location in the SWM fi eld, which, 
in turn, increases activation at the associated location in long-term 
mem ory. After 4 s (400 time steps in the model), the target input is 
turned off, and the peak in SWM drifts away from midline (away 
from Location 150) during the 10-s delay. Next, the choices are in-
put to the model. This is accompanied by a lowering of the resting 
level of neurons in SWM, moving the fi eld into “choice” mode. 
This effectively destroys the target-related activation peak, allow-
ing the choices to structure activation in SWM. Finally, we raised 
the resting level. As a consequence, the fi eld “chooses” one of the 
choice inputs; that is, the SWM fi eld forms a peak centered at one 
of the choices. This is refl ected by the activation peak at the end of 
each simulation.
Given this method for generating a choice response with the 
DFT, can this model capture results from the present study? The 
entire set of simulations depicted in Figure 6 provides an initial 
sketch of the full account. The simulations in the left column de-
pict 7-year-olds’ performance across Experiments 1-3, and the 
simulations in the right column depict adults’ performance across 
the three experiments. The model parameters used for each age 
group were held constant across the three experiments, and the de-
tails of the choice input were changed to match our experimen-
tal manipulations: fi ve close choices in Experiment 1, nine close 
choices in Experiment 2, and fi ve choices far apart in Experiment 
3. Across the two age groups, we manipulated the spatial preci-
sion of the local excitation/lateral inhibition function that governs 
neu ral interactions in SWM. Spencer and colleagues (Schutte et 
al., 2003; Spencer & Hund, 2003) have proposed that local excit-
atory interactions are stronger and more precise later in develop-
ment with strong, narrow lateral inhibition. The interaction func-
tions used in the simulations are depicted in the inset graphs at the 
top of Figure 6. All other model parameters were identical across 
age groups.
Given the changes in neural interaction and the structure of the 
choice set used here, analyses of the DFT suggest that two factors 
infl uenced choice performance in this study. The fi rst factor is the 
amount of memory drift for the two age groups. As can be seen in 
Figure 6, the 7-year-old model’s memory for the target location 
drifts dramatically during the memory delay, consistent with the 
large draw errors reported here and the large spatial recall errors 
reported in previous studies (see, e.g.. Spencer & Hund, 2003). By
Figure 6. Simulations of the dynamic fi eld theory for a 7-year-old (left column) and an adult (right column) 
for each experiment. The spatial working memory fi eld, u-swm(x), and the long-term memory fi eld, u-ltm(x), 
are shown for each simulation. Insets at the top of each column of simulations show the local excitation/lateral 
inhibition function used for each age group.
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contrast, the adult model’s memory drifts much less during the de-
lay, consistent with the signifi cantly smaller errors for the adults 
in Experiments 1 and 3 and with data from previous studies (see 
Spencer & Hund, 2002). The difference in delay-dependent drift 
in the model results from the difference in neural interaction— ac-
tivation peaks in the adult model are more precise and more sta-
ble. Consequently, they are less infl uenced by the inhibitory com-
ponent of the midline input.
Drift in SWM plays a critical role in choice selection because 
it structures activation in the long-term memory fi eld. It is the 
activation in this latter fi eld that tips the balance in favor of one 
choice over another (recall that the target-related peak of activa-
tion in SWM is destroyed at the start of the choice interval). As 
can be seen in Figure 6, the large memory drift of the 7-year-old 
model produces a broadly distributed pattern of activation in long-
term memory, whereas the small memory drift of the adult model 
produces a more focused activation pattern in long-term memory 
that is closer to the correct target location.
The second factor that affects choice responses is that the mod-
el is biased to select one of the central choices when the choic-
es are close together (Experiments 1 and 2); that is, the model 
is biased against selecting the outermost choices. Note that the 
model shows a bias against the outermost choices even though 
the choices input to the model did not overlap. This occurs be-
cause the input provided by the choices blends slightly given 
the (im)precision of locally excitatory interactions. The blend-
ing means the activation on either edge of the inner choice in-
puts is higher than activation on the outer edges of the outermost 
choices. This gives a compet itive advantage to the inner choices. 
It is important that this occurs only when the choices are close 
together, as we demonstrate below. In addition, this bias is stron-
ger for the 7-year-old model given that local excitatory interac-
tions are less precise (see insets in Figure 6).
Taken together, these two factors explain the pattern of simu-
lation results in Figure 6 and provide insights into results of the 
present study. Consider the performance of the 7-year-old model 
fi rst. As can be seen in the top left panel of Figure 6, the 7-year-
old model selected the correct choice on this trial from Experi-
ment 1. This occurred because memory drifted beyond the choice 
set, and the model was biased against selecting the rightmost (the 
outer most) choice. Note that this is consistent with our empirical 
fi nd ings: Children in Experiment 1 did not perform signifi cant-
ly above chance on the control trials, suggesting that they were 
biased against selecting an outermost choice. Note also that it is 
likely that children’s memory drifted beyond the choice set rela-
tively fre quently in Experiment 1. As evidence, we conducted a 
follow-up analysis of the data from Experiment 1, excluding data 
from locations where memory was unlikely to drift (37.5, 50, 100, 
150, and 167.5 mm). Using children’s draw responses as an index 
of where memory drifted for each target location, we found that 
memory drifted beyond the choice set on 30% of all choice trials. 
Children picked the closest choice (the outermost choice) on 28% 
of these trials, whereas they picked the second closest choice on 
47% of these trials. Thus, a microanalysis of children’s responses 
is consistent with the behavior of the model.
The second panel in the left column of Figure 6 shows the 7-
year-old model’s performance in a trial from Experiment 2. Here, 
the model makes a geometrically biased error by selecting the op-
tion two choices to the right of the target. As can be seen in the 
simulation, with nine choices, it is quite likely that there will be a 
choice in the spatial region to which memory has drifted. This can 
explain why we found no signifi cant differences between choice 
and draw responses in this experiment. Finally, in the simulation 
of a trial from Experiment 3, the 7-year-old model makes a geo-
metrically biased error one choice to the right of the target (see 
Figure 6). As in Experiment 1, with fi ve choices, there is less of 
a chance that there will be a choice located in the region to which 
memory has drifted. This would tend to produce more accurate 
responses in the choice task. In contrast to Experiment 1, howev-
er, the model shows less of a bias against the outermost choices. 
These two tendencies combined might explain the mixed results in 
this experiment—we found not only a higher percentage of correct 
responses for the 7-year-olds but also a greater tendency to show 
geometric biases in the choice task relative to Experiment 1.
What about the adults? Given the smaller memory drift in 
the adult model, there is a greater likelihood that there will be a 
choice that overlaps the location where memory has drifted. Thus, 
we would expect to see more systematic geometric biases in the 
choice task for the adults. This is consistent with our empirical 
results. Nevertheless, as can be seen in the simulation in Fig-
ure 6, such geometric biases will be countered in Experiment 1 
by the bias against choosing an outermost choice. This might be 
the source of the smaller geometric biases in the choice task in 
this experiment. Note that this bias would play the strongest role 
where memory drift is the largest—at the infl ection points of the 
sinu soidal pattern.
In Experiment 2, we saw robust geometric biases. As can be 
seen in Figure 6, this is the case with the model as well: The adult 
model makes a geometrically biased error by selecting the option 
one choice to the right of the target. It is noteworthy that this bias 
is smaller than the bias seen with the 7-year-old model. Although 
this is not consistent with our statistical fi ndings, it is consistent 
with the smaller errors for the adults in Figure 4. Finally, in Ex-
periment 3, we found that adults picked the correct choice quite 
often. This is the case with the model as well. Note, however, that 
the activation peak in the bottom right panel of Figure 6 is close to 
the outermost target. Thus, in some cases, it is likely that the mod-
el will select the geometrically biased choice because of stochastic 
fl uctuations in activation in SWM. As discussed above, this type 
of digitization error will result in a large error, which could ex-
plain the signifi cant geometric bias in Experiment 3 even in the 
context of a higher percentage of correct responses.
In summary, the simulation results in Figure 6 provide useful 
insights into the performance of both age groups in the present 
study. Nevertheless, it is important to note that these insights are 
qualitative in nature given the lack of quantitative fi ts. We did not 
pursue such fi ts because of practical constraints. To quantitatively 
model results from this study with the process-oriented approach 
described here, we would have had to conduct close to 10,000 
simulations (50 simulations at each of 11 target locations × 2 age 
groups × 3 selected orientations of the choice set × 3 experi ments). 
Given this unwieldy number of simulations, a more prac tical ap-
proach to the challenge of quantitative simulations would be to 
conduct more focused empirical studies designed to test specifi c 
aspects of the account provided here.
In this context, we return to an issue raised previously: Given 
that the choice task differed in several ways from the draw task, 
does the DFT offer insights into how these differences contributed
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to performance? Central to our account are the processes that se-
lect a single discrete item from the choice set input to the mod-
el. Thus, our account suggests that the presence of several simulta-
neously available alternatives played a critical role in the task. 
This predicts that we should see fewer differences between spa-
tial recall performance and performance in a same/different rec-
ognition task in which participants must identify whether a sin-
gle probe item matches a target item after a delay. This is indeed 
the case (see Simmering, Spencer, & Schöner, in press; Werner & 
Diedrichsen, 2002).
Does this indicate that verbal responses per se (e.g., saying “red” 
or “same”) are unimportant? The answer is no. Indeed, Spencer et 
al. (in press) recently demonstrated that the same biases reported 
here arose in a task in which participants had to verbally judge 
whether a target object was above a reference object. We suspect 
that the use of spatial prepositions can modify the stability of the 
SWM processes captured by the DFT. Given that apparently sim-
ple changes in the task can lead to a complex pattern of results, 
the larger message of our model is that a formal understanding of 
the processes that give rise to performance can make an important 
contribution to understanding spatial cognition.
Implications for the Two-Memory-Systems Account
According to the two-spatial-systems view (Milner & Goodale, 
1995), spatial cognition can be partitioned into a sensorimotor 
system that encodes locations in the service of motor actions and 
a cognitive system that encodes locations in the service of ver-
bal responses (Bridgeman, 1999; Bridgeman et al., 1981). This dis-
tinction is derived from evidence for two cortical pathways for vi-
sual information: a ventral stream for picking up information re-
lated to object identifi cation and a dorsal stream for handling visu-
al information for action (Lacquaniti et al., 1997; Milner & Goo-
dale, 1995; Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982). It is important that be-
havioral evidence from experiments with normal populations also 
supports this distinction. For instance, adults’ verbal re sponses 
show the Titchner circles illusion (Ebbinghaus illusion): A circle 
appears to be larger if it is surrounded by smaller circles than if 
it is surrounded by larger circles. Nevertheless, participants cor-
rectly shape their grip when reaching to one of the circles (Aglio-
ti, DeSouza, & Goodale, 1995), even when reaching to remem-
bered circles, that is, when vision of the hand is occluded during 
the reach (Haffenden & Goodale, 1998).
There are many recent behavioral tests of the two-systems 
view (e.g., Bridgeman et al., 1997, 2000; Haffenden & Goo-
dale, 1998; Proffi tt et al., 1995) and an accompanying set of tests 
that argue against this distinction (e.g., Franz, Bulthoff, & Fah-
le, 2003; Franz, Gegenfurtner, Bülthoff, & Fahle, 2000; Smeets 
& Brenner, 2001; Vishton & Fabre, 2003; Vishton, Rea, Cutting, 
& Nuñez, 1999). The question here is whether the present results 
have implications for the two-systems proposal. To answer this, 
we must fi rst consider which memory systems are used in the 
draw and choice tasks. The drawing task required a sensorim-
otor re sponse implicating dorsal stream processes, whereas the 
choice task required a verbal response implicating ventral stream 
pro cesses. This view is qualifi ed, however, by the type of bias 
examined—geometric bias. Although geometric bias increases 
systematically over delay (see Spencer & Hund, 2002)—a hall-
mark characteristic of the sensorimotor system (see also Bridge-
man et al., 1981; Brungart et al., 2000)—such biases are clearly 
grounded in an allocentric reference frame. According to Milner 
and Goodale (1995), this places geometric biases squarely with-
in the ventral stream.
To successfully perform the drawing task, however, people 
must integrate and coordinate information from both processing 
streams, taking an allocentric memory of the target location and 
using it to move the hand in a body-centered reference frame (Mil-
ner & Goodale, 1995). Although results of the present study in-
dicate little about how such coordination takes place, the mod-
el used here—the DFT—does. In particular, the simulations pre-
sented in Figure 6 show how a single integrated dynamical system 
can generate both sensorimotor recall responses and verbal choice 
responses within the same SWM fi eld. Additionally, recent work 
in autonomous robotics shows how the dynamic fi eld framework 
can be used to govern the behavior of an autonomous agent as it 
navigates through the world (Bicho, Mallet, & Schöner, 2000). It 
is important to note that this requires the real-time coordination of 
egocentric and allocentric reference frames, a central challenge to 
the integration of dorsal and ventral stream processes (for related 
work, see Pouget, Deneve, & Duhamel, 2002). Note that applica-
tions of the dynamic fi eld framework do not challenge neurophys-
iological evidence of dorsal and ventral visual pathways; rather, 
such applications suggest that solutions to the challenge of inte-
gration are within reach.
Implications for Spatial Cognitive Development
Comparisons of children’s and adults’ responses in the pres-
ent study revealed a shifting pattern of developmental differenc-
es across experiments. Adults’ errors were signifi cantly smaller 
than 7-year-olds’ errors in Experiments 1 and 3, but this was not 
the case in Experiment 2. These results underscore the point that 
developmental differences must be considered relative to the con-
straints provided by the task. It is important to emphasize, how-
ever, that children and adults remembered locations for differ-
ent delays in the present study. We did this to make the task more 
manageable for children yet still reveal robust biases with adults. 
Clearly, the difference in delays qualifi es the lack of signifi cant 
age-related differences in Experiment 2.
Although we found a complex pattern of developmental re-
sults, simulations of the DFT suggest that this model can capture 
these details through developmental changes in the spatial preci-
sion of neural interactions. This adds to the growing list of fi nd-
ings captured by this “spatial precision hypothesis” (see Schutte 
et al., 2003; Spencer & Hund, 2003). In particular. Spencer and 
col leagues have used this same parametric change in the mod-
el to account for both quantitative changes in A-not-B-type bias-
es be tween 2 and 6 years (Schutte et al., 2003) and, more recent-
ly, qualitative changes in geometric biases between 3 and 5 years 
(Schutte, 2004). Note, however, that the current results provide 
only a limited window onto developmental continuity given that 
we examined performance at two time points across a broad age 
range. Nevertheless, it is certainly promising that we were able to 
capture the performance of 7-year-olds and adults with a single 
developmental change in the model.
Note also that our results do not address the issue of wheth-
er there are important discontinuities in development that occur 
with the onset of profi cient spatial language use (Hermer-Vazquez 
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et al., 2001). We examined only one time point in early devel-
opment, and our choice task included a very constrained use of 
verbal labeling. This was by design to isolate whether verbal re-
sponses in a spatial recognition task would show geometric biases. 
Clearly, however, it is critical to move beyond this in future exten-
sions of the ideas presented here. For instance. Smith, Samuelson, 
and Spencer (2006) are currently examining whether concepts of 
the DFT can help explain how children use space to bind together 
words and object features. Similarly, results from several recent 
studies with adults have demonstrated that the DFT can capture 
novel aspects of adults’ use of spatial prepositions such as above 
(Spencer et al., in press).
Conclusion
The present study stands at the intersection of three literatures— 
the literatures on spatial recall, the two-spatial-systems view, and 
spatial cognitive development. Our results showing that geomet-
ric biases generalize across pointing and verbal response types in 
both recall and recognition tasks suggest that greater cross-talk 
among these literatures would be profi table. Indeed, such cross-
talk might lead to a different view of the organization of spatial 
behavior, one that emphasizes the task-specifi c integration of 
“sensorimotor” and “cognitive” spatial behaviors rather than the 
partitioning of behav ior into separable subsystems that develop 
in a discontinuous manner over development. We suggest that the 
CA and DFT models offer an exciting starting point in this regard, 
one that might ultimately move these literatures forward toward a 
more formal, process-oriented future.
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